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FEDERAL PROTECTION OF NEGRO VOTING
RIGHTS
BuRtK MARSHALL*
For ninety-four years our Constitution has forbidden the states and their officials
to deny any of our citizens the right to vote on account of their race The broader
right to vote freely in national elections is a privilege of United States citizenship
that federal law has long protected from arbitrary infringement-state or private
Despite these long-standing guarantees, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights has found that racial denials of the right to vote occur in sections of eight
states.3 In five of those states Negroes constitute more than a quarter of the adult
population, but very few of these Negroes are registered to vote. For example, in
Mississippi only five per cent are registered; in Alabama only fourteen per cent are
registered; in South Carolina, sixteen per cent are registered; in Georgia, twenty-six
per cent are registered; and in Louisiana, twenty-nine per cent are registered.
Registration among adult whites invariably exceeds fifty per cent. In eleven coun-
ties where Negroes are in the majority none is registered In ninety-seven counties
fewer than five per cent of the adult Negroes are on the rolls. Indeed, in most
counties with sizable Negro populations the Negro voter totals are significantly
below the statewide percentage of eligible Negroes registered and neither figure
approaches the white voter percentage.P
In our experience Negro non-voting results almost exclusively from racial dis-
crimination by state officials and fear among Negroes engendered by the attitudes
and actions of white persons-including some office-holders 7
*B.A. 1944, LL.B. x95r, Yale University. Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of justice.
This article, like the work of the Division, incorporates and reflects the work of a number of extra-
ordinarily hard-working and able lawyers in the Division. Among them, the accredited author wishes
particularly to thank David L. Norman, in connection with the preparation of this manuscript.
' Ratifications of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were completed in 1868 and x870,
respectively. The more explicit fifteenth amendment proscribes only racial distinctions. United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 2X4 (1876); the fourteenth amendment enjoins all wholly arbitrary voting denials, in-
cluding racial ones. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (927). This
paper is confined to the problems of racial disfranchisement because Negroes comprise the only minority
group whose voting rights are substantially abridged. UMranE STATEs COMMassION oN CIL RIo=r,
REPORT x8 (g6i) [hereinafte cited as C.R.C. REPORa'].
2Ex parte Yarbrough, s'o U.S. 651 (884); Twining v. New Jersey, 2i U.S. 78, 97 (9o8)
(dictum); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958).
'C.R.C. RaPORT 22 (x96x): Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee.
'Lowndes and Wilcox counties, Alabama; Webster County, Georgia; Issaquena, Jefferson, Noxubee
and Tallahatchie counties, Mississippi; and East Carroll, Madison, Tensas, and West Feliciana parishes,
Louisiana.
'Ten counties in Alabama; three counties in Florida; sixteen counties in Georgia; forty-seven counties
in Mississippi; seven counties in South Carolina; and fourteen parishes in Louisiana.
' C.R.C. REPORT 52-53 (1959).
"Discrimination by registration officials has secondary effects. We were once puzzled by counties in
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This paper explores our problems: the techniques of discrimination and intimida-
tion, and the present efforts of the United States Department of Justice to secure to
all the right to vote without distinction of race.
I
FEDtAL LAw
After more than eighty years of civil rights desuetude, Congress adopted a voting
statute in i957-the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Together, the act's four principal
sections authorize the Attorney General to institute civil suits in the federal district
courts (regardless of whether the persons aggrieved have exhausted other remedies)
to prevent and redress racial and other arbitrary interferences with the right to vote.8
which, although fear was not a factor, few Negroes applied to register. We know now that the bulk of
a Negro community considers attempting to register to be an idle gesture after a few of their teachers
and ministers have been rejected as unqualified. For instance, in Bullock County, Alabama, only five
Negroes were registered when the Justice Department brought suit in 1961. During 196o only one Negro,
a minister, had applied. He was rejected twice. Today he and more than 7oo others are on the rolls.
871 Stat. 637 (3957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (958):
(a) All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the
people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or
other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation
of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right
of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other person to vote for,
or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member
of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the Terri-
tories or possessions, at any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose
of selecting or electing any such candidate.
(c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about
to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege secured
by subsection (a) or (b), the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of
the United States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief, including an application
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order. In any proceeding hereunder
the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
(d) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to
this section and shall exercise the same without regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have ex-
hausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.
Read narrowly, the sections seem not to reach all deprivations of voting rights. For instance, under
subsection (b) may I harass a registration organizer whose right to vote in federal elections is far from
my mind because he is domiciled in a distant state? No, because of the effects of my actions on the local
Negro community. See United States v. Wood, 295 F.ad 772 (5 th Cir. r961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 85o
(1962). May one intimidate me with impunity because his only purpose is to deter my participation in
local elections? Definitely not, if my registration is interfered with because, in the absence of a split
registration system, I am signing up to vote federally as well as locally, and the actor's purposes should be
inferred from the effects he produces, not his secret intentions. See United States v. Beatty, 288 F.2d 653
(6th Cir. z961); United States v. Ellis, 43 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D.S.C. 1942). Subsection (b) should
also protect a registrant who is threatened as he approaches the polling place in a non-federal election,
because again, whatever the actor's personal motive, the deterrent effect of that threat will extend to federal
voting. See I THoMAs EMERsON & DAVID HAaBE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGTs IN THE UNITED STATEs 68
(2d ed. 1958).
Conceivably, a private person could deny another the right to vote for racial reasons by some means
other than threats, intimidation, or coercion. Any such conduct could be attacked under subsection (a)
if it occurred in a federal election. Even in a non-federal election it could probably be reached by a
conspiracy theory because peaceable deprivations of voting rights are virtually impossible without some
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In 196o Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in two important ways: (I) The
district courts are now authorized to appoint voting referees after finding a pattern
of discrimination. The voting referees are to assist the court in receiving and passing
upon applications for registration from Negroes in the affected county, if, after
court judgment, local officials deny registration to Negroes0 (2) The state may be
joined as a party defendant in a proceeding involving section i97i(a) rights, or the
state alone may be sued if, prior to the institution of the action, the offending state
or local officials have resigned and no successors have been appointed °
Tide three of the 196o Act requires that all records and papers relating to registra-
tion, the payment of poll taxes, or other acts requisite to voting in federal elections
be retained and preserved for a specified period and that they be made available to
the Attorney General for inspection and copying.1'
II
THE Acvs IN OPERATION
The Justice Department is fulfilling its obligations to prevent discrimination
and intimidation by pursuing a three-stage program: (I) taking corrective action;
(2) supervising compliance; (3) conducting in as organized a fashion as possible
an expanding program of affirmative action to insure full and free exercise of the
franchise by Negro citizens.
Whenever the Department of Justice has reasonable grounds to believe that acts
of discrimination or intimidation against Negroes have been committed for the
purpose or with the effect of depriving them of the right to vote or of interfering
with their exercise of the right to vote, an investigation is conducted. These in-
vestigations usually include a thorough analysis of the registration and voting records
connivance by local officials. Their participation with the private individual would supply the necessary
element of state action. Cf. Brown v. United States, 204 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953).
It may be that private non-racial denials of the right to vote in local elections are not covered by the
act. Fortunately, they rarely occur except in a vote fraud context and then such deprivations are
probably covered by federal criminal statutes if local officials are involved. 18 U.S.C. § 371, 242 (Supp.
1961); cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (X941).
Non-coercive, non-racial but arbitrary denials by local officials of the right to vote in federal and
local elections can be prosecuted under A8 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 (federal elections) and § 242 (local
elections). See EmaRsoN & H Arn, op. cit. supra, at 158-59.
'See 6oi (a) of the act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. g6i) provides that upon a
finding by the court that persons have been deprived on account of race of subsection (a) rights, and
that such deprivation was or is pursuant to a pattern or practice, any other person of such race within
the affected area is, upon his subsequent application, entitled to an order declaring him qualified to vote
upon proof that (i) he is qualified under state law to vote, and (2) subsequent to such findings by the
court, he has been (a) deprived of the opportunity to register or otherwise to qualify to vote, or (b)
found not qualified to vote by any person acting under state law.
0 Sec. 6ox (b) of the act amended § 1971 (c) by adding: "Whenever, in a proceeding instituted under
this subsection any official of a State or subdivision thereof is alleged to have committed any act or prac-
tice constituting a deprivation of any right or privilege secured by subsection (a), the act or practice
shall also be deemed that of the State and the State may be joined as a party defendant and, if, prior
to the institution of such proceeding, such official has resigned or has been relieved of his office and no
successor has assumed such office, the proceeding may be instituted against the State."
" Sections 301-3o6, 42 U.S.C. § 1974 et seq. (Supp. 196i). See Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 86o(5th Cir. 1962).
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of the county involved and extensive interviews with persons in the county by agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If we conclude that discrimination ha,
occurred, the Department makes every effort to correct the illegal practices by
bringing them to the attention of state and local officials. If negotiation is unavailing;
a suit is filed under section i97I.
Between September 1958 and May 15, 1962, twenty-one section 1971 (a) suits and
six section 197 I(b) suits have been filed under section I971. By May 15, 1962, five
of the section 197I(a) suits had culminated in the issuance of injunctions by the
federal courts. In two counties preliminary injunctions favorable to the Government
have been issued. Four are awaiting decision on the merits and on one the Gov-
ernment has appealed from the denial of a preliminary injunction. In the section
1971(b) cases, five have been disposed of favorably to the Government by stipulation
or consent judgments. The remaining one is awaiting hearing but a preliminary
injunction has been issued favorable to the Government pending the hearing. These
cases have arisen in five states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Tennessee.
As illustrated by the cases discussed below, intimidation is the weapon of those
who would suppress completely all Negro interest in voting. The numerous tech-
niques of discrimination are used to frustrate Negroes' attempts to apply to register,
to reject the applications of qualified Negroes, to prevent poll tax payments by
Negroes, to exclude Negro registrants from primary elections, and, when all else
fails, to purge Negro voters from the registration rolls.
A. Illegal Suppression of Negro Voting
As noted above, four cases have been against defendants who attempted to squelch
Negro interest in registration by intimidation, threats, and coercion.
A case which arose in Wathall County, Mississippi, illustrates intimidation by the
misuse of local criminal processes."2  The defendants are the registrar of voters,
the sheriff, city attorney, and the district attorney of Walthall County. The Gov-
ernment's affidavit in support of its motion for a temporary restraining order
recites that John Hardy, a Negro who was conducting a registration school in
Wathall County, accompanied two local Negro applicants to the registrar's office.
They had barely arrived when the registrar ordered Hardy from the office and
struck him on the head with a gun as he complied. The sheriff arrested Hardy a
few hours later, charged him with disturbing the peace, put him in jail where he was
interviewed for several hours by the district attorney with a tape recorder, and re-
quired him to post bond before being released and to appear in the justice of the
peace court for trial.
The court of appeals has enjoined the state's prosecution of Hardy pending a
hearing in the federal district court on our contention that the treatment of Hardy
is an illegal intimidation of Walthall County's Negro would-be voters.
"United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5 th Cir. x961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
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Three cases involving economic coercion arose in Haywood and Fayette counties,
Tennessee.3 They seek to enjoin more than 15o defendants, including landowners,
banks, and business associations, from intimidating and coercing Negro citizens
for the purpose of interfering with their right to register to vote in federal elections.
Despite their numerical preponderance in both counties, no Negroes were regis-
tered in Haywood in 1959 and very few were on the rolls in Fayette. The Depart-
ment's complaints charge that when registration by Negroes began in 1959 the
defendants undertook to circulate lists of the names of Negroes who were active
in the registration movement for the purpose of inducing the white community
to engage in a variety of economic reprisals against them, including loss of employ-
ment, denial of loans and other credit. The complaint also charged that when this
form of intimidation was not successful, the defendants began a series of mass
evictions of sharecroppers who had registered to vote. Consent judgments favorable
to the Government have just been entered in the Beaty, Barcroft and Atkeison cases.
Significantly, about 3,0oo and 2,oo Negroes are now registered in Fayette and
Haywood counties, respectively.
The fifth case' 4 involved intimidation of Francis Joseph Atlas, a Negro farmer
from a Louisiana parish in which no Negroes are registered although they out-
number the white persons. Francis Joseph Atlas, a Negro cotton farmer who
had raised twelve children and given college educations to all but the youngest two
(they were in high school), tried several times to register to vote. He was told when
he took his cotton to be ginned that his cotton wouldn't gin. When he asked why,
the ginner replied, "civil rights." Mr. Atlas had been subpoenaed to testify about
his efforts to register and when this was known all of the cotton ginners in the
community decided that they would not gin any more of Mr. Atlas' cotton.
The soy bean processors refused to process his beans. Merchants from whom
Atlas had bought farm supplies refused to trade with him. For example, the one
feed store clerk in the store told Atlas that he had orders not to handle sales to
Atlas and that he would have to see the manager. Atlas went to the manager and
the manager said, "Yes, I gave those orders. I have enough customers without you.
I don't need your business. I would appreciate it if you don't come back."
The Department of Justice Complaint asked the court to issue an order requiring
the cotton ginners and other merchants in Atlas' community to open the channels
of trade to him on the same basis as they were open to other citizens. Under
pressure from the court Atlas' cotton was ginned and he is still farming in his com-
munity. He is still not registered, but the Government has also brought suit to
prevent the local registrars from denying Negroes their franchise and this suit has
already been submitted to the district court on the merits.
"3United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. ig6i); United States v. Barcroft, 288 F.2d 653 (6th
Cir. ig6x); United States v. Atkeison (W.D. Tenn., No. 4131). The Beaty and Barcroft cases were
consolidated.
" United States v. Deal (W.D. La. No. 8132).
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B. Discriminatory Disqualification of Negro Applicants
Where Negroes are unafraid and undeterred by discriminatory rejection of their
leaders who attempt to register, they apply in significant numbers. Often there are
threshold problems, e.g., registrars secrete themselves in unlikely places in the court-
house and, when ferreted out, they resign their offices which go unfilled for long
periods.15
However, most of the rejections of qualified Negroes are effected by the manipula-
tion of the lengthy and intricate registration procedures and standards that are
employed in five of the problem states. Many of these "tests" were originally
designed to facilitate the arbitrary exclusion of Negro applicants and their present
use to that end is widespread.' 0
i. Identification Device
Negroes have been prevented from applying for registration by the requirement
that they produce one or more registered voters to "vouch" for them, that is, to
identify them. Louisiana law authorizes this procedure where the registrar "has
good reason to believe that [the applicant] is not the same person" whom he repre-
sents himself to be. The Alabama application form contains a similar requirement.
Where few or no Negroes are registered, they are, in effect, dependent upon white
voters to vouch for them. Three cases filed by the Department of Justice attack this
requirement as applied.
The first case'" arose in Bullock County, Alabama, where only five of the 4,450
Negroes of voting age were registered in i96o. The county board of registrars had
a rule that applicants for registration must be "vouched" for by a registered voter
and that a voucher could identify only two applicants in a calendar year. The only
Negro applicant during 196o was a minister who was rejected twice. One of the
Negro registrants vouched for him on both attempts. Later the voucher accompanied
his son, a teacher, to the registration office. The teacher was not permitted to apply
because his father had exhausted his "vouches" for 196o. The district court in-
validated the limitation rule as patently unconstitutional 9
The second case20 arose in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. No Negroes have
been registered there since 1922 although they are the adult majority. The suit
charges that Negroes have been effectively denied the opportunity to apply by the
requirement that they must produce two registered voters to identify them. White
15 C.R.C. REPORT 75-75 ('959).
'" C.R.C. REPORT 31-33 (959). See also Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), afl'd,336 U.S. 933 (1949).
17 "The applicant shall in all cases be able to establish that he is the identical person whom he
represents himself to be when applying for registration. If the registrar has good reason to believe that
he is not the same person, he may require the applicant to produce two credible registered voters of his
precinct to make oath to that effect." LA. REv. STAT. tit. x8, § 37 (1950).
"
8 United States v. Alabama (M.D. Ala., No. 1677-N).
"Ibid. (unreported). Other issues and enforcement problems in this case will be dealt with infra.
For an earlier chapter in that county's voting history, see Sellers v. Wilson, 123 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Ala.
1954).
"United States v. Manning, 2o5 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
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persons have had no difficulty with the identification requirement because, among
other reasons, they are permitted to be identified by their previous registration.
The case was decided favorably to the Government; as of mid-July the procedures
of the 196o statute were being invoked to determine the qualifications of Negro
applicants.
The third case21 arose in Madison Parish, Louisiana, where no Negro has been
registered since 19oo. The facts alleged are essentially those of the East Carroll case.
No trial date has been set.
The discriminatory use of Louisiana's identification requirement was held un-
constitutional in 1952 when the registrar of voters of Bossier Parish was enjoined
from engaging in this practice.22 This illustrates one of the recurrent problems faced
by the Department of Justice: one injunction against a practice does not necessarily
end that practice in other counties. The result is a time-consuming multiplicity of
suits.
2. Devices Involving Literacy and Understanding
Negroes who overcome the threshold problems and make application to register
may be rejected on one or several grounds even though they possess the same quali-
fications as white persons who are registered in the county. This results from the
discretion vested in registrars to administer ostensibly neutral literacy and under-
standing tests. In some states, including Georgia and Alabama, applicants for regis-
tration are required to be able to read and write any paragraph (or article) of the
Constitution of the United States (or of the state) .2 In Alabama applicants are
also required to fill out a lengthy application and questionnaire without assistance2
In Louisiana and Mississippi applicants for registration are required to under-
stand (or read) and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of the constitution
of the state (or of the United States) .2 These states also require each applicant to
fill out a form without assistance.28
(a) The Read and Write Test. The Georgia and Alabama reading and writing
requirements have been involved in two cases brought by the Department of
Justice under section 1971(a).
2' United States v. Ward (W.D. La., No. 8547).
"Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. La. 1952), afl'd, 2ox F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1953).
"Alabama: "The following persons, and no others... shall be qualified to register as electors ...
those who can read and write any article of the Constitution of the United States in the English language
which may be submitted to them by the board of registrars ... " (ALA. CoNsr. § 8x1, Amend. XCI).
Georgia: 'Every citizen of the State shall be entitled to register as an elector . . . who ... comes within
either of the classes provided for in the two following subdivisions: (I) all persons who are of good
character and understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of govern-
ment; or (2) all persons who can correctly read in the English language any paragraph of the Constitution
of the United States or of the State and correctly write the same in the English language when read
to them by any one of the registrars . ..." GA. CONsT. § 2-704 (1945).
2' ALA. CoNSr. § i81, Amend. XCL Neither Alabama nor any of its Boards of Registrars has promul-
gated answers to the questions, many of which are difficult and ambiguous. C.R.C. REPORT 73 (X959).
"LA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §(D) (1922), as amended; Miss. CONSr. § 244, as amended.
"LA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § a(C) (1922), as amended; Miss. CoNsT. § 244, as amended.
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I One case" arose in Terrell County, Georgia, where only fifty-three of 4,057
Negroes over 18 were registered in 1958. Negro school teachers had been denied
registration on account of their failure to pass the oral reading test. One of the
teachers mispronounced the word "equity." A Negro applicant with one year of
college was rejected on the ground that he could not write legibly. In fact, by
dictating unreasonably fast, the registrar made it impossible for the applicant to
transcribe the passage accurately. The court found that Negroes were required to
read and write more lengthy and difficult constitutional provisions, that the pro-
cedures resulted in easier tests for white applicants, and that a higher literacy level
was required of Negroes. 28
The Alabama case29 arose in Macon County where Negro applicants, including
many with college degrees, had been denied registration on the ground that they
had made "errors" in filling out their applications. White applicants, including at
least one illiterate and others with little or no education, were assisted in filling out
their applications and were registered.
Negro applicants were repeatedly required to copy lengthy portions of the
Constitution, ostensibly to demonstrate their literacy. For example, Mrs. Marie
Williams, who had had three years of college and who applied unsuccessfully five
times, was required on each try to copy article two of the United States Constitution
(about i,ooo words). She wrote a total of twenty pages. Thus was the literacy
test used to discourage and delay Negro registration.
(b) The Application Form as a Test. In counties in Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana the application forms themselves have been used as a test. These forms
appear to be intended to secure routine, superficial information about the applicant
and they are unobjectionable when used in this way. But, again and again, well
educated Negroes, who set forth all the substantive data called for, have been denied
registration because they made trivial errors on the form. Because the states have
not issued prescribed answers, even to the registrars, eminently qualified Negroes
are compelled to play a humiliating, futile form game with registrars who set their
own standards and who often refuse to apprise unsuccessful applicants as to where
they erred.
Conversely, white applicants usually get all the help they need, from each
other and from the registrars to fill out the form. Moreover, white applicants whose
forms contain errors for which Negroes are rejected are almost invariably registered
if the basic information requested by the form appears on it in some comprehensible
way.
Several cases illustrate these practices. In one Alabama action"° the Government
showed that, between January i, 1956 and June i6, i96i, a board of registrars accepted
96.6 per cent of the white applicants while rejecting 754 per cent of the applications
"7United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 12r (M.D. Ga. i96o).28 Ibid.
2 9 United States v. Alabama, i92 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. z961).
" United States v. Penton (M.D. Ala., No. 174x-N).
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by Negroes. Seven hundred and ten of the "unqualified" Negroes had twelve or
more years of formal education and among them they had filed over 1,2oo applica-
tions. These Negroes' applications were rejected as improperly executed. It de-
veloped that, as applied to white persons, the forms were questionnaires, not tests.
Similarly, documents and testimony in a Mississippi case3' disclose that white
registrants' applications bear "x" marks at an oath line which Negroes, whose applica-
tions are unmarked, were rejected for their failure to sign.
Finally, several thousand Negro voters were challenged and removed from' the
rolls in Louisiana on the ground that they had made errors in filling out their
original application cards. White registrants who had made similar or worse errors
were not even challenged. The Department of Justice has attacked this practice in
four cases under section 1971(a)3" and the two cases decided have resulted in the
restoration to the voting rolls of more than i,8oo Negroes. 3
(c) The Interpretation Test. The Louisiana interpretation test has been chal-
lenged per se in United States v. Louisiana.4 The requirement that applicants for
registration must be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any
section of the Constitution is attacked on the ground that the history and setting in
which this test was adopted and has been enforced, and the uncontrolled discretion
which is vested in registrars who administer the test, render it unconstitutional under
section 1971 and under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
The discriminatory administration of the test is challenged in four other suits
which have previously been filed by the Department under section i97I. 5 Only one
of these cases has been tried and decided. 36 There, Negro school teachers, one of
whom had a Master's degree from Stanford University, were denied registration on
the ground that they did not interpret a provision of the Constitution to the satis-
faction of the registrar. The court found that less stringent standards were applied
to white applicants, who were invariably registered, than to Negro applicants, none
of whom had been registered. On the other hand once the registrar adopted the
formality of giving the constitutional interpretation tests to whites, sections such
as "there shall be no imprisonment for debt" were used or if the section was harder
the white applicant was given an opportunity to copy an answer.
The Government's proof on a motion for a preliminary injunction in a Mississippi
case37 shows that all Negro applicants have been subjected to the interpretation test
5 1United States v. Lynd (S.D. Miss., No. 1646).
" United States v. McElveen, iSo F. Supp. Io (E.D. La. 1959), afg'd sub nom. United States v.
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (i96o); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana, x96 F. Supp.
9o8 (W.D. La. ig6i); United States v. Manning supra note 2o. United States v. Ward (W.D.
LA., No. 8547).
"'United States v. McElveen, supra note 32; United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of
Louisiana, supra note 32.
"' E.D. La., No. 2548.
55 United States v. Lucky (W.D. La. No. 8366); United States v. Fox (E.D. La., No. 11625); United
States v. Wilder (W.D. La., No. 8695); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana,
supra note 32.
" United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana, supra note 32.
'7 United States v. Lynd, supra note 31.
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but that none of the white persons took it before January i961. Moreover, the
Negroes are invariably confronted with lengthy, highly legalistic provisions and none
has been registered since the mid-fifties.
3. Impeding Poll Tax Payments by Negroes
Five states now require the payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting,
although not to registrationf 8 By now the tax itself is a negligible, bi-racial deterrent
to voting. However, local officials occasionally manipulate the requirement so as to
disfranchise Negroes.
In one Mississippi county white voters pay their poll taxes to "collecting deputies"
in either of the county sheriff's widely separated offices. Negroes who proffer their
payments to the deputies are invariably told to see the sheriff, who is rarely in either
office and never in both.
The section 1971 (a) case, which seeks to equalize the payment procedures, is
presentiy on appeal from the district court's denial of the Government's motion
for a preliminary injunction 9
4. A White Primary
It is generally assumed that white primaries are extinct. In 1959, however, as
Negroes began to register in significant numbers in rural Fayette County, Tennessee,
local Democratic leaders hit upon a plan to insure continued white control of county
offices. For the biennial local primary, election notices were placed in each ballot
box to the effect that voter participation was confined to white Democrats. The
election officials followed the notices and our section i971(a) suit followed the
election.4°
A consent judgment barring discrimination in any process used to select local
candidates was entered prior to the 1961 primary in which Negroes voted freely.
III
ENFORCEMENT: TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS
The preceding section considered the kinds of discrimination and intimidation
that Negroes have encountered in their efforts to vote and the remedial actions under-
taken by the Justice Department.
This section outlines the practical problems that must be dealt with in order
to secure the issuance of, and compliance with, an effective court decree.
A. The Case Before Judgment
Cases begin in several ways. Negro victims of obvious discrimination, e.g., those
who are unable to find elusive registrars and those who are not permitted to make
application, often complain formally to the Department.4 ' However, Negroes,
"S Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.
"United States v. Dogan (N.D. Miss. 1962).
"United States v. Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee (W.D. Tenn., No. 3835, x96o).
" The same is true of intimidation cases. Our threshold problems are greater here, however, because
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especially in rural areas, are frequently unaware of the discrimination that is occur-
ring. Those who fill out lengthy forms and attempt to explain intricate constitutional
provisions are not surprised to be told that they have erred and are not qualified
under the state's stringent standards. Because communication between the white
and Negro communities is minimal on these matters, the Negroes do not know
that the tests are applied only to them. Thus, the Negroes often concentrate on
improving their performance level by studying registration forms and taking practice
registration tests without realizing that they may already be qualified under the
standards by which white persons are registered. In communities where the
complete segregation of the races is a long-standing tradition, voting by white persons
is regarded as a routine corollary of citizenship to which they are presumptively
entitled; Negroes, however, bear the burden of proving that they are "qualified."
As a result, we have not received complaints from many counties in which seventy
to eighty per cent of the white adults are registered but only a handful of Negroes,
although many have applied.
We have sought to bridge this gap by inquiring about low Negro registration
in statistically suspicious counties. If our inquiry discloses that applicants are being
rejected, we may then seek to inspect and copy the registration records, application
forms, and the like. These may reveal evidence of discrimination, such as that
white persons' forms have been filled out by the registrar, or that Negroes' applications
are graded more strictly. In this way we also secure the names of registrants and
rejectees of both races in order to interview them for a comparative analysis of the
processing of white and Negro applicants.
In those instances where the records will not be too helpfu 42 or to secure them will
require time-consuming litigation, we initiate the "records demand" process while
proceeding along other lines. That is, we do not wait for documentary evidence of
discrimination to proceed in a county if most white adults are registered and
qualified Negroes are being turned down. These two facts alone establish a case of
discrimination 3 Only the details of the techniques of discrimination are lacking,
and they can be supplied through discovery proceedings and further extensive in-
vestigation.
The responses to our complaints vary, of course, with the caliber of our legal
opposition. At their extremes the reactions are newspaper diatribes and innumerable
ingenious, dilatory motions"
Negroes who do not apply to register on account of fear do not, for the same reason, complain to the De-
partment.
42 Where applicants are required to read aloud a portion of a constitution (South Carolina), or to
interpret orally a section of a constitution (Louisiana), there will not be any written record of those
parts of the qualification tests.
"Cf. Byrd v. Brice, supra note 22.
"he success of such motions varies from (judicial) district to district. By responding promptly
to all motions we seek to minimize the law's delays and to avoid being, in effect, required to acquiesce
in opposing counsels' requests for extensions of time. Nevertheless, dilatory tactics have had some success
because of crowded docket and, in some cases, judges that are hostile to civil rights cases. Although
the average length of time between complaint and trial in our cases is just under six months, we have
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A racial registration trial is usually highlighted by the absurd contrast between
the testimony of Negro teachers about their failures to qualify and the efforts of
white semi-literate registrants to explain how they got on the voter rolls. For
several reasons, however, the less spectacular registration records are the heart of a
case. In all counties, however small, the combined totals of white persons accepted
and Negroes rejected amount to too many individual instances of discrimination to be
presented to the court by live testimony. Moreover, each person's experience is a
tiny chip in the huge mosaic that is the history of registration in the county. The
records are usually the repository of those fragments and, by thorough, careful
analysis before trial, they can be made to tell the county's voting story. For instance,
Alabama requires, among other things, that its applicants fill out correctly an applica-
tion and a 21-question form of four pages. To analyze the form of each of the
thousands of applicants accepted and rejected is a formidable but fruitful task. Thus,
in the Montgomery County, Alabama, case45 the Government filed a largely factual
brief of 293 pages and eight attachment volumes of documents depicting graphically,
statistically, and otherwise every item of the many forms of discrimination that
characterized registration there in recent years.
The records disclose not only past discrimination; they are the best evidence of
the county's actual registration standards. As a suit looms, registrars often become
impossibly exacting with all applicants without distinction of race. Frequently new
registrars take over by reason of resignations or simple expiration of terms of office,
and even with the best of motives, the new registrars cannot know without in-
vestigation (which is in fact best supplied by the evidence brought in litigation) as
to past practices. Such events freeze registration and clearly create inevitable dis-
crimination in counties with, say, ninety per cent of the adult whites, but only ten
per cent of the adult Negroes presently on the rolls as a result of past discrimination.
It is our view that the de facto registration standards of the recent past must con-
tinue in effect; alternatively, all voters must register anew if the requirements are to
be changed.40
An exhaustive analysis of the records enables the court to articulate precisely
in its decree the standards by which applications are to be judged by the registrars
or a voting referee.
B. Enforcement of the Decree
As a trial ends we present to the court a proposed decree, as well as findings of
fact and conclusions of law, in which we specify precisely the discriminatory
procedures to be enjoined. With myriad opportunities for discrimination, a general
encountered some serious delays. United States v. Raines, x89 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. x96o), was tried
21 months after the complaint was filed; United States v. Majors (S.D. Ala., No. 2584) was tried in
May 1962, 13 months after the filing of the complaint; United States v. Lucky (W.D. La., No. 8366) was
begun in July x9t6, and no trial date has been set. No trial dates have been set in three Mississippi cases
that were filed in 196r.
"United States v. Penton, supra note 30.
"' Clearly, a tightening of standards discriminates against those who are unregistered at the time
of the change.
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injunction not to discriminate is ineffective against registrars who are unwilling
or unable to be fair. Moreover, good faith registrars require clear guidelines to
administer fairly the highly subjective registration tests. '
It is too early to make more than a tentative judgment on the workability and
curative effects of the courts' decrees.48 Unquestionably, however, a court's power
to hold recalcitrant defendants in contempt induces some measure of compliance with
its orders. Moreover, the knowledge that a federal voting referee may be appointed
in the event of non-compliance spurs circumspection among local officials to whom
"outside interference" is as much anathema as Negro voting. Finally, the courts'
decrees usually give us continual or periodic access to the records as well as requiring
the defendants to document their doings and to file complete reports with the
courts at specified intervals. Of course, judicial and departmental ubiquity are im-
possible and undesirable.
We are trying to secure compliance with the law through decrees that are effective
but not onerous, enforceable but not harassing.
C. A Case's Repercussions
While it is still too early to write confidently of all the effects of a voting case,
dearly the first case in a judicial district is educational for all concerned. The
courts, we, and defense counsel know better the materials that will be subject
matter of any subsequent controversies. We know each other, too. More important,
the Negro communities in neighboring counties learn more of the role of the Depart-
ment of Justice and of their own opportunities. Conversely, nearby registrars may
become fairer in their testing of Negro applicants.
Finally, there is a new awareness that the United States Department of Justice is
determined to make discrimination against Negro voters unknown in this land.
This awareness, and our activities, expand in an organized fashion from county to
county within a judicial district so that the Negro citizens of one county, as well as
moderate and responsible white citizens, are able to witness the experience of their
neighbors in giving effect to the democratic processes required by the Constitution.
Our experience is that this mushrooming growth of recognition of the civil right to
vote makes the inevitability of the process known and accepted and the transition
easier.
' The present Administration's proposed "literacy" bill (H.R. 10034) S. 2750, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962) would go far toward eliminating the discrimination that almost inevitably occurs when a southern
white man applies a subjective standard to a Negro. The bill equates intelligence sufficient for voting
with a sixth grade education by providing that accredited sixth-graders shall not be required to pass tests
to qualify to vote in federal elections.
'a There has been no significant increase in Negro registration in Terrell County, Georgia, since the
decree in United States v. Raines, supra note 27. However, about 1,7oo Negroes registered in Macon
County, Alabama, in the year after the court order was issued.
